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Causality and Creation in Cbasidic Kabbalism 
Owen Goldin 
An important strain of medieval Jewish thought, kabbala, finds its most explicit and rationalistic exposition within the Chasidic philosophical tradition. A key work is the 
Tanya of R. Schneur Zalman of Liadi ("the Alter Rebbe," 
1745-1812) the founder of the Lubavitch or Chabad movement. 
Kabbalistic interpretation, speculation, and practice had been 
traditionally understood to be too dangerous for all but those who 
had reached the highest levels of spiritual and intellectual 
achievement. For R. Schneur Zalman, on the other hand, all people 
share the intellectual faculties by which the metaphysical structure 
of the cosmos can to some extent be grasped. A straightforward, 
philosophical exposition of these teachings could allow all who 
study it to understand as much as they are able, which, he thought, 
could only be to the good. 1 
The second book of the Tanya, Shaar HaYichud 
VehaEmunah (/'he Gate to [the Understanding of} G-d 's Unity and 
the Faith) deals with the relation between the existence of God and 
that of other things, most importantly, that of human beings. R. 
Schneur Zalman argues that, if God is the truly first cause, He must 
be self-sufficit:nt, which in turn means that He lacks nothing 
10n the historical circumstances of R. Schneur Zalman's 
strategy of communicating hitherto concealed teachings, and the 
opposition it encountered, see N. Loewenthal, Communicating the 
Infinite: The Emergence of the Habad School (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 29-98. 
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required for the exercise of His causal power. Monism is the 
logical consequence, 2 for if there were anything other than God, in 
regard to which He exercises His power, such exercise would 
depend on this external thing, and for this reason God would no 
longer be self-sufficient and all-powerful.3 Nonetheless, there 
appears to be a multiplicity of objects; this multiplicity is con-
signed to how things seem to us, in a manner that is reminiscent of 
the Parmenidean distinction between being and doxa (appearance). 
Given that this multiplicity is, in reality (that is, from the 
perspective of God) merely the one God, God is responsible for 
every detail within the phenomenal world.4 This is not to say that 
the regularities that the phenomenal world exhibits have no ground 
at all other than their divine origin. R. Schneur Zalman dovetails 
an essentialist account of things within his occasionalistic monistic 
2The view that R. Schneur Zalman takes things other than 
God to be illusions is argued by R. Elior, The Paradoxical Ascent 
to God: The Kabbalistic Theosophy of Habad Hasidism, tr. J. M. 
Green (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 
49- 57; see also R. Foxbrunner, Habad: The Chasidism of R 
Schneur Zalman of Lyady(Northvale, N.J.: J. Aronson, 1992), pp. 
110- 11. N. Gurary, Chasidism: It Development, Theology. and 
Practice(Northvale, NJ.: J. Aronson, 1997),pp. 120-21, 134-37, 
points to the importance of creation to argue that R. Schneur 
Zalman' s meaning is not that the world is an illusion. Rather, he 
argues, his teaching is merely that the world is contingent. He does 
not explain why an illusion cannot be something of importance 
arising through the divine will. 
3 Tanya 1.20-22. 
4See Tanya 2.7. This view derives from the Ba'al Shem 
Tov, the founder of Chasidism. See Gurary, 139- 142, who 
compares this teaching to that of Maimonides. 
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metaphysics.5 The regularities within the world can be rendered 
intelligible by showing how as a matter of logical necessity they 
are entailed by these essences. But the existence of a thing with a 
certain essence, and the set of the essences that there are, are 
contingent, at every moment brought about through an act of divine 
causation. (The essences of things are understood as resultant from 
the combination and arrangement of the letters that make up their 
Hebrew names.) 
R. Schneur Zalman acknowledges that the existence of the 
world cannot be really explained; the nature of divine causality is 
far beyond the grasp of the human mind. Nonetheless, he presents 
an account of it, by developing the metaphors of light and speech. 
The positive account developed within the Tanya can be 
best understood ·in contrast to the classical notions of causality that 
would have been familiar to R. Schneur Zalman through his 
extensive reading in medieval Jewish philosophy. 
What sort of causal link between one event and another is 
it that we can immediately understand? Consider what occurs when 
someone, call him Michael, hands a letter to someone else, call him 
Sam. What is the cause of Sam's having the letter? Clearly it is the 
fact that Michael handed over the letter. This event explains Sam's 
possession of the letter, and renders this fact intelligible. There is 
a necessary link between being given a letter and possessing a 
. 
5Thus in Tanya 2.2, accidental change (yesh miyesh) is 
distinguished from the coming into existence of a new substance 
(yesh me 'ayin). See the exposition ofY. Wineberg in Lessons in 
Tanya, vol. 3 (Brooklyn: Kehot, 1989), pp. 846-47. As in 
Aristotelian physics, these two varieties of change are distin-
guished depending on whether there is persistence of an essential 
attribute. But for R. Schneur Zalman substantial and accidental 
change, as Aristotle understands them, would both fall under the 
class of yesh miyesh,, for even substantial generation involves the 
actualization of a potentiality inherent within already existing 
matter. So even here some substrate with some essential attribute 
persists through the change. 
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letter. Consider another case: fire warms the metal which is placed 
near it. On a naive understanding of heat and physical objects, here 
too something is being given over from one thing to another. The 
heat of the fire is transmitted, as it were, to the metal. A third case 
is that of the sun, and its light. The sun radiates its light, which 
allows it to be seen, in such a way that it allows other things to be 
seen. In all of these cases, the fact that B is C is explained by 
showing how this is necessitated6 by the fact that C is given to B 
by A.7 
6If the effect does not necessarily result from the cause, the 
whole cause has not been identified, and the effect has not been 
thoroughly explained. One could still ask why the effect that did 
not have to come about did in fact occur. These considerations lie 
behind the great appeal of a foundationalist account of scientific 
explanation, like that of Aristotle' s Posterior Analytics and its 
descendants. Insofar as one rejects the view that explanations rest 
on principles or facts that do not demand explanation, what one 
accepts as an explanation will depart from the ideal of rendering 
the world intelligible. 
7The accounts of heat and light that are given by con-
temporary science·greatly complicate our understanding of the true 
sequence of events involved in such cases. At the atomic level, the 
transfers of energy involved are astonishingly complex, and again, 
atthe subatomic level, there are apparently gaps between cause and 
effect, so that it is not immediately evident why a certain cause 
must result in a certain effect. This is because, according to recent 
theories in physics, neither heat nor light tum out to be a kind of 
stuff or thing, handed over from one place to another. (Indeed, on 
one interpretation, the theory of general relativity calls into ques-
tion the extent to which we are ultimately justified in considering 
Michael, Sam, and the letter as substantial realities.) But I bring up 
heat and light only as examples. If there really were cases in which 
one thing is handed over from one place to another, we would have 
a case of an intelligible, necessary causal connection. 
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Such explanations rely on what A. C. Lloyd has called 
''The Transmission Model of Causality," pervasive in Western 
philosophical thought. 8 Its most comprehensive and systematic use 
was in the natural philosophy of Aristotle, to which R. Schneur 
Zalman would have been exposed, in his reading of Maimonides. 
Although within Aristotle's Posterior Analytics little is said of 
explanation through the identification of the efficient cause, in his 
physical and biological treatises, Aristotle identifies a great num-
ber of links between efficient cause and effect which conform to 
the transmission model. Just as the fire imparts it own heat to the 
object sitting near it, so an animal is thought to transmit its own 
species-form to its offspring. The series of regular natural events 
is to be understood as a series of basic stuffs or beings in the 
process ofbeing·transmitted from source to recipient. In each case, 
given appropriate contact, a thing which is actually x must transmit 
x to that which is only potentially x.9 God's activity too, was 
8See A. C. Lloyd, "The Principle that the Cause is Greater 
than the Effect," Phronesis 21 (1976): 146-51 and A. P. D. 
Mourelatos, "Aristotle's Rationalist Account of Qualitative 
Interaction," Phronesis 29 (1984): 1-16. 
9 Aristotle's conception of efficient causation is to be 
understood along the lines of the transmission model. Formal 
causati_on follows this model only insofar as one is explaining the 
efficient cause for the form's inherence of matter ( although 
perhaps the attribution of a formal cause to a state of affairs 
understood synchronically would follow this model, insofar as the 
form is understood as something different from the composite 
substances whose .basic attributes and abilities are inherited from 
the form, imparting to them its structure and attributes). In the case 
of final causation we can hardly have a case of a future, planned 
event, transmit something back to the present Nonetheless the 
purpose in the mind of the agent can be transmitted ~hrough action. 
That is to say, that which the agent has in mind, first exists in the 
mind, and thereby is imparted to that which has the potentiality for 
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understood in this way, especially among the Greek neoplatonists 
and the Arab Aristote)ians. 10 God is thought to be the cause of the 
being of things by virtue of imparting the being that He has in 
Himself. The analogy is often made to the sun, which iJluminates 
all things by imparting its own light.11 
being its substrate. Similarly, the final cause of the developing 
organism is found in the form of that organism which is transmitted 
through the seed (Phys. 2.7 198a22-27, Meta. Z 7). The case of 
material causation may be hardest to subsume under the 
transmission mode). One can say, however, that pre-existent matter 
is responsible for certain attributes of a composite substance since 
it conveys some of its (lower-level) formal attributes to the com-
posite of which is the substrate. (For example, the bottle is brittle 
because it is made of glass, and glass is a brittle stuff.) 
1
°This is also how Maimonides understands Aristotle's 
account of God's activity. See . the discussion in Guide of the 
Perplexed 2.12 of God's activity as an "overflow," a neoplatonic 
notion absent from the writings of Aristotle, for whom God, as 
object of desire, is responsible for the motion of things, not their 
existence (Meta. 12. 7). Maimonides accepts the neop)atonic 
version of Aristotelian metaphysics put forward by the Arabic 
Aristotelians, especially al-Farabi. See his praise of al-Farabi's 
works as "faultlessly excellent" in the letter to Samuel Ibn Tibbon, 
quoted in the S. Pines, "Translator's Introduction'' in Maimonides, 
The Guide of the Perplexed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1963). 
11See Plato, Republic 6 508b-509c, Plotinus, Enneads 
5.3.12.39-44and 5.l.6.26-30(on which seeJ. Bussanich, The One 
and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus: A Commentary on Selected 
Texts [Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill, 1988], pp. 134-35), from 
which derives the pseudo-Aristotelian Theology of Aristotle 8, by 
which the metaphor was conveyed to Arabic Aristotelians and to 
Jewish philosophers, including Jewish mystical thought; cf. G. 
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But it would seem as though causality as transmission is 
incompatible with monism. Must not that which is imparted, and 
that which receives it, be truly different from that which is doing 
the imparting? 
Perhaps multiplicity itself is that which is being imparted 
to the world. But, in accordance with the Transmission Model, the 
source of the multiplicity would already have multiplicity within 
it. But this is incompatible with monotheism and, a fortiori, with 
the monism which R. Schneur Zalman takes to be fundamental to 
Judaism. 
If, as Tanya 2.1 declares, love of God is to rest on knowl-
edge of God, the transmission model of causality, accepted as 
furnishing a complete understanding of what it is to cause either 
something to exist or an event to occur, would be dangerous to 
Jewish life. But within the second book of Tanya an alternative 
account of causation is put forward, to the end of rendering 
partially intelligible God's activity upon and in the world. 
*** 
In Chapter 2 of the second book of the Tanya, R. Schneur Zalman 
addresses the objection of those who question the philosophical 
possibility of the miracle by which the Red Sea was parted. The 
heretics object that such an irruption in the natural course of events 
is unacceptable to reason. In response, the R. Schneur Zalman 
sugges~s that they are focusing on the sort of creation that occurs 
when one created being ( such as an artisan) works on another (such 
as an artifact). But God's activity involves bringing about the vel)' 
being of a thing, a mode of causation both higher and more 
fundamental than that involved in the miracle of the parting of the 
Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (New York: Schocken 
Books, 1946), p. 203. J. Schochet outlines Jewish antecedents for 
the sun and light analogy in Mystical Concepts . in Chasidism 
(Brooklyn: Kehot 1988), pp. 41-42 n. I 2; reprinted as an appendix 
to Likkutei Amarim- Tanya 887, n. 12. 
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Red Sea. In the latter case, an existing substance was simply given 
a new characteristic. R. Schneur Zalman calls it "[ making] one 
existing thing out of [ another, already] existing thing (yesh miyes). 
The greater miracle lies in the fact that a thing exists at all: the fact 
that God has created a thing out of nothing (yesh me 'ayin)."12 In 
providing this answer to the heretic, R. Schneur Zalman makes 
clear that the point he is making is not merely conceptual; it is 
ethical. He asks the reader to consider the ethical consequences of 
the heretic's objection. If indeed it were impossible for the Red 
Seas to part, if indeed this would be beyond the capacity of God, 
or would constitute a compromise in God's unity, Torah would be 
a compilation of falsehoods, and there would be no obligation to 
perform or keep from performing any action, simply on account of 
the fact that it is commanded by Torah. 
The model of causation that is presented to account for 
yesh m 'ayin is the tzimtzum (alternatively translated as "contrac-
tion" or "concealment.")13 The basic idea, which R. Schneur 
Zalman adopts from Lurianic kabbala, is that creation does not 
involve adding anything to reality that was not already in the 
source. For saying this imputes a deficiency to the source. If, in the 
beginning, all there is is the source, and this source is lacking in 
nothing, how could anything possibly be added to it? Yet creation 
occurs. Since it is a causal activity, it would seem that creation 
somehow involves transmission of what is in the source. 
Transmission to what? To something new? But if there is some-
thing new, then in the process of creation something new has been 
added to the source, and we have seen that, from the monistic 
standpoint that R. Schneur Zalman adopts, this is impossible. 
So how can creation be a process by which something new 
comes about? Creation must be a kind of subtraction from the 
12See Tanya2.2, 289- 91, and the commentary of Wineberg 
in Lessons in Tanya, vol. 3 (1991), pp. 843-47. 
13The following remarks are confined to the first tzimtzum, 
the tzimtzum harishon, by which creation ex nihilo is effected. 
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source. Nothing is present in the created that is not in the creator, 
but there is much in the creator that is not in the created. Creation 
is to be understood as a process by which God conceals and 
restricts His own being. 14 Given the monistic assumptions that 
underlie the account of creation, this concealment and restriction 
cannot constitute a real withdrawal of God away from the world, 
a point on which R. Schneur Zalman and his successors insisted, 
in opposition to those who interpreted the Lurianic teaching as 
asserting that God is not present within the phenomenal world. 15 
The tzimtzum furnishes the conditions under which such an 
appearance can arise. The withdrawal of God is. the means by 
which there comes about the limited perspective by which reality 
is perceived in a manner different from how it is perceived by God. 
God' s causality, then, is jointly found in transmission and 
withdrawal. 
Although the true nature of the tzimtzum is wholly 
impenetrable to human reason, 16 two metaphors shed some light is 
shed on this. The first is that of the relation between the sun and its 
14See the introductory accounts of the tzimtzum in G. 
Scholem, pp. 260-64; J. Schochet, Mystical Concepts in 
Chasidism (Brooklyn: Kehot, 1988), pp. 47-57; Elior, pp. 79- 8 l; 
Gurary, pp. 95-102; R. Oakes, "Creation as Theology: In Defense 
of a Kabbalistic Approach to Evil," Faith and Philosophy 14 
( 1997): 510--22. 
15See Tanya 2. 7, On the controversy, see Elior, pp. 80--91 , 
Gurary, pp. 102-16. 
16See, for example, Tanya 2.4, 299: "And it is not within 
the scope of the intellect of any creature to comprehend the 
essential nature of the tzimtzum and concealment [ of the life-force] 
and that nonetheless the body of the creature itself be created ex 
nihilo--just as it is not within the capacity of _any creature's 
intellect to comprehend the essential nature of the creation of being 
out of nothing." 
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light. We have noted that, among the Greeks, this served as a 
prototypical example of a causal relationship of transmission. 
Thus, according to Republic 6 the sun transmits both wannth, by 
which physical things exist, as well as light, by which other 
physical beings are aware of them (through sight). Likewise, the 
Form of the Good transmits being to the Forms (which in tum are 
responsible for whatever intelligible characteristics physical things 
possess), and also imparts that which is required if they are to be 
known. The Good performs this function by its own intelligibility 
and being to the things for which it is responsible.17 
Neoplatonic thinkers found a new way to exploit Plato's 
metaphorical description of the Form of the Good as a kind of sun. 
The ultimate cause of all things, the Good or the One, causes the 
Forms to be through a kind of flowing out, or imparting of what is 
already within it. Like the outpouring of the sun' s radiance, this is 
a kind of transmission of inner content that does not diminish that 
which is present in the source, by which the source is never 
exhausted. The model of emanation is likewise extended to other, 
derivative causal processes. Divine causation is thus understood as 
a kind of transmission of characteristics that God already pos-
sesses. 
The metaphor of the sun shining on the created world 
maintains a real distinction between cause and caused, the agent 
and the recipient of the transmission. This is incompatible with the 
monistic metaphysics of the Tanya. R. Schneur Zalman deals with 
this issue by finding a third way to exploit the metaphorical liken-
ing of God to the sun. 
According to the neoplatonic metaphor, the rays of the sun 
represent Intellect, the second hypostasis, which is multiform and 
different from the One, its source, which radiates as it remains 
17See G. Santas, "The Form of the Good in Plato's 
Republic" in J. P. Anton, and A : Preus, eds., Essays in Ancient 
Greek Philosophy, vol. 2 (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1983), pp. 232-63. 
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unchanged.18 As such it is an antecedent for R. Schneur Zalman' s 
use of the metaphor. But R. Schneur Zalman alters the force of the 
metaphor by taking it in a new direction. He considers the status of 
the unity and independence of the sun' s rays, as regarded from the 
vantage point of the sun itself. The sun is likened to God, that 
which has the true perspective of the unity of all things, the sun's 
rays to the things that God creates (which, from the outside, are 
aware of a p]urality). When considered in relation to the sun itself, 
the rays have no separate existence, they are simply an aspect of 
the sun's activity, an aspect which, if properly understood, is not to 
be distinguished from the central activity of the core. However, 
from a perspective distanced from the sun, a perspective from 
which one is blind to the inner workings of the sun's radiance, each 
ray spreads itself out independently from the sun, and appears to 
have an existence unto itself. 
There in its own place, this radiance is considered 
naught and complete nothingness, for it is abso-
lutely nonexistent in relation to the body of the 
sun-globe which is the source of this light and 
radiance, inasmuch as this radiance and light is 
merely the illumination which shines from the 
body of the sun-globe itself. It is only in the space 
of the universe, under the heavens and on the 
earth, where the body of the sun-globe is not 
present, that this light and radiance appears to the 
eye to have actual existence . . . ln the same 
manner the term YESH ("existence" can be 
applied to all created things only [as they appear] 
to our corporeal eyes, for we do not see nor 
comprehend at all the source, which is the spirit of 
G-d, that brings them into existence. 19 
18See the Plotinus references in n. 11. 
19Tanya 2.3, 293- 95. 
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R. Schneur Zalman must accept a kind of idealism, in order to 
grant some limited reality to the phenomenal world. In reality, 
there is only God, but there are many appearances of many other 
things. Creation is, in effect, the generation of a multiplicity of 
perspectives. Only that perspective that comprehends the unity of 
all things is true. Yet other perspectives exist. They themselves are 
caused by a kind of transmission: they exist by virtue of that which 
possesses the true perspective. In this way, R. Schneur Zalman 
suggests that one can understand how it can be the case that all 
objects other than God depend on God for their very being, and yet 
show themselves to us as having an independent existence of their 
own. From the point of view of God there is only God; yet, from 
our point of view, distant from God and His workings, the results 
of the divine activity (including ourselves) seem to have the status 
of independent beings. 
We see that the Tanya employs a Transmission Model of 
Causality, with a difference. It is not only the being of the attribute 
itself that is being transmitted. Rather, what is being transmitted is 
primarily consciousness, by virtue of which there is a unique 
perspective by which there can be awareness of such an attribute. 
For such consciousness is the precondition of the phenomenal 
existence of attributes. But is not the generation of even a new 
perspective the adding of something new, which was not present 
in the divine source? R. Schneur Zalman denies this. The 
generation of a new perspective is merely a subtraction, by virtue 
of the tzimtzum. What is subtracted is the awareness of God as the 
ultimate source and the ·ultimate reality. It is this that makes 
possible a separate consciousness, able to see itself and other 
objects as independent beings.20 The sun metaphor is intended to 
20
"In reality, they [heaven and earth] are completely 
nullified in relation to the 'Word of God' and the ' Breath of His 
mouth,' may He be blessed, wh1ch are unified with His Essence 
and Being, may He be blessed ... just as the light of the sun is 
nullified in the sun. Yet these are his Restraining Powers, to hide 
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provide some limited comprehension of how created beings are 
mistakenly seen by themselves as separate, independent beings. 
But al 1 of the rays of the sun are qualitatively alike. The 
metaphor fails to account for how it can be the case that there is the 
appearance of different things, from those perspectives that are 
generated. We have already noted that such appearance could arise 
only through the tzimtzum. Two things appear different only be-
cause that which they have in common is somehow suppressed or 
canceled. But the metaphor of the sun and its rays, which lends 
itself so well to the transmission model, and can be exploited to 
illustrate how an effect can be substantially one with its cause, is 
unsuited for illustrating this aspect of Creation, as R. Schneur 
Zalman conceives it. For in the tzimtzum, the cause withholds it-
self from its effect. But what could be a negative transmission, or 
a taking of the effect back into the cause? This cannot be illumi-
nated by appealing to how things are with the sun, for the sun's 
radiance does not involve subtraction or taking anything away. 
There is need of another, complementary metaphor, which 
illustrates how it is possible for something "new" to come to be, by 
virtue of a withholding or constriction of the cause. Such a meta-
phor is provided by the Scriptural account of Creation. The Zahar 
(I I Sb) teaches that the divine utterances related at the beginning 
of Genesis are the actions by which God creates the world.21 R. 
Schneur Zalman exploits this to develop the metaphor of creation 
as speech, which complements the metaphor of creation as 
radiance. 
Even from a naive point of view, not attending to the 
intricate cognitive processes that underlie communication, speech 
and conceal, through the attribute of Gevurah [restraint] and 
Tzimtzum, the life-force which flows into them, so that heaven and 
earth and all their host should appear as if they were independently 
existing entities" (Tanya 2.6, 305-7). 
21See The Zohar, tr. H. Sperling and M . Simon (London: 
Soncino Press, 1933), pp. 68--69, cf. 381 . 
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cannot be adequately understood within the framework of the 
Transmission Model of Causality. To be sure, any sort of com-
munication might be regarded as a transmission of meaning, from 
one mind to another. But ( even if one were to grant the possibility 
of the sort of communication that telepathy or prophecy might 
involve) what is internal to the cause of the communication is far 
different from what is expressed. To say something is to select 
what is expressed from the practically unlimited number of things 
that might be expressed. Other thought is held back. Contrast the 
sun, as R. Schneur Zalman understands it. What is within the sun, 
heat and light, is radiated. There is no kind or characteristic within 
the sun that is held back, and that which is radiated is all of a kind. 
Thus, R. Schneur Zalman understands the speech metaphor 
as conveying the teaching that creation is a kind of communication, 
whereby only what is spoken is not concealed. But even as he 
explains this point, he hastens to remind his readers of what the 
sun metaphor makes clear, tha~ even following Creation, what is 
created is not something different from what creates it: 
However, "The nature of the Divine order is not 
like that of a creature of flesh and blood" 
[Berachot 40a]. When a man utters a word, the 
breath emitted in speaking is something that can 
be sensed and perceived as a thing apart, 
separated from its source, namely, the ten 
faculties of the soul itself.22 But with the Holy 
One, blessed be He, His speech is no~ Heaven 
forfend, separated from His blessed Self, for there 
is nothing outside of Him, and there is no place 
devoid of Him. Therefore His blessed speech is 
not like our speech, G-d forbid, Gust as His 
thought is not like our thought ... His blessed 
speech is called "speech" only by way of an 
22This is a reference to the ten sephirot, aspects of divine 
activity which have their analogues in human psychology. 
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anthropomorphic illustration, in the sense that, as 
in the case of man below, whose speech reveals to 
his audience what was hidden and concealed in 
his thoughts, so, too, is it on high with the blessed 
En Sof, 23 Whose emitted light and life-force-as 
it emerges from Him, from concealment into 
revelation- is called "speech."24 
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Just as a sage can only express his wisdom by means of the 
expression of words, which are vastly more limited that the things 
that remain unsaid, so God expresses His being only by means of 
the tzimtzum, understood along the model of speech. 
Now, with terrestrial man, for example, when one 
who is so great a sage as to comprehend the 
wonders of wisdom contracts his intellect and 
thought to a single letter of his speech, this is an 
immense tzimtzum and a great descent for his 
wondrous wisdom. Metaphorically speaking, 
precisely so, and infinitely more so, there was an 
immensely great and mighty tzimtzum when 
during the six days of creation "The heavens were 
made by the word of the Lord, and all their hosts 
by the breath of their mouth."25 
23This refers to God as the infinite, prior to any revelation. 
24Tanya 1.21 , 87. 
25Tanya 4.5, 415. Here R. Schneur Zalman seems to have 
. in mind the contraction of a conceptual account into the physical 
fonn of articulate speech; in other works (Ma 'amre Admor ha-
Zaken 5562 [Brooklyn: Kehot, 1964], p. 35; Ma 'amre Admor ha-
Zaken 5568 [Brooklyn: Kehot, 1982], pp. 484, 548) he makes clear 
that the expression of an abstruse concept in simple terms com-
mensurate with the student's level of understanding is similarly an 
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Only by virtue of such "speech" is the wisdom of the sage 
articulated into discreet elements. Likewise, only through the 
divine "speech" does there arise the phenomenal multiplicity, by 
virtue of which each thing that appears to be an independent entity 
manifests distinct characteristics. These characteristics are all 
present in the source; as such the metaphysics of R. Schneur 
Zalman follows the Transmission Model. But the tzimtzum, 
especially as illustrated by the metaphor of voice, points to a 
crucial respect in which effe.ct does not simply flow from the 
source. The characteristics of things that are derived .from God 
reveal themselves to us as limited, and they do not immediately 
reveal to us their ultimate source within the divine unity. These 
limitations do not themselves exist in the effect by virtue of being 
transmitted by the source. Rather they exist because what has been 
transmitted is itself I imited. 
The great virtue of the Transmission Model of Causality 
is that it renders intelligible the relation between cause and effect. 
A Humean theory of causation, on the other hand, denies that the 
world presents such intelligible connections; for Hume there are 
only regular sequences of like perceptions. Neither the 
Transmission Model nor the Humean theory, however, serves to 
illuminate the relationship between God as cause and Creation, as 
required by a religious monism. The tzimtzum, as illustrated by the 
dual metaphor of sun and voice, goes a long way to fill the gap. 
I am grateful for the suggestions and advice offered by R 
·Yoseph Samuels, R Zelig Rivkin, Irving Block, and Chad Meister 
concerning earlier versions of this paper. 
Marquette University 
example of the contraction found in speech. 
